The right was clearly established at the time of the conduct. Koby spoke to Plakas who had some difficulty communicating the fact that he did not have his driver's license (which he had surrendered as bond for a traffic ticket he received in Illinois). They talked about the handcuffs and the chest scars. He raised or cocked the poker but did not swing it. Cited 1106 times, Perkovic v. Marine City Police Officer Heaslip, LUNA-DIAZ et al v. HACKENSACK POLICE DEPARTMENT et al, Romero v. Board of County Commissioners of, ESTATE OF RONALD SINGLETARY et al v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA et al, Estate of Andre Alexander Gree v. City of Indianapolis, Estate of Jason Ike Pero, by Personal Representative Holly Gauthier v. County of Ashland et al, Matthew King v. Hendricks County Commissioner, Jensen, Tristan v. Budreau, Anthony et al, United States of America v. City of Albuquerque, Nelson v. Board of County Commissioners of the Bernalillo County et al, Bradley v. Rochester Police Department et al, KING v. HENDRICKS COUNTY COMMISSIONERS et al, Jonas v. Board of Commissioners of Luna County. They could have used disabling chemical spray, or they could have used a dog to disarm Plakas. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3, 85 L. Ed. The alternatives here were three. Also, in Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. Plakas told them that he had wrecked his car and that his head hurt. Jo Ann PLAKAS, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Konstantino N. Plakas, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jeffrey DRINSKI, in both his individual and official capacity and Newton County, Indiana, a municipal unit of government, Defendants-Appellees. 1992), it was claimed that the police had so poorly planned an arrest that the chance of a deadly gunfight was increased rather than minimized. Yet there exists a possibility that although Drinski's acts were justified given his circumstances, Newton County may be held liable for creating those circumstances. This appeal followed. Drinski did most of the talking. See Perfetti v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. See, e.g., John Barry & Tom Morganthau, Soon, 'Phasers on Stun', NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 1994, at 24-26. Further, says Plakas, a photograph of the clearing shows there was no tree there to stop Drinski, just a sapling, and there are no footprints corroborating Drinski's story of retreat. Drinski believed he couldn't retreat because there was something behind him. See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 104 L. Ed. Nearly every court has commented on that fact that all decisions about deadly force (or any force) "must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving." Plakas told Cain he had been the driver of the car in the ditch, and Plakas agreed to get into Cain's car in order to be driven back to the accident scene, now about a mile from where Plakas was found. An alternative plan could have reduced or eliminated the possibility of the arrestee's use of a gun. Illinois. 2. Plakas was turned on his back. Bankruptcy Lawyers; Business Lawyers . . Code Ann. 1992). He fell on his face inside the doorway, his hands still cuffed behind his back. Further, says Plakas, a photograph of the clearing shows there was no tree there to stop Drinski, just a sapling, and there are no footprints corroborating Drinski's story of retreat. 1994) - ". Twice the police called out, "Halt, police," but the plaintiff may not have heard. The only witnesses to the shooting were three police officers, Drinski and two others. This guiding principle does not fit well here. Roy told him that he should not run from the police. Voida fired one shot at Tom which did not hit him, but he insisted on lunging at her again. Plakas ran to the Ailes home located on a private road north of State Road 10. right of "armed robbery. A volunteer fireman found him walking . Drinski and Perras had entered the house from the garage and saw Plakas leave. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1697, 85 L. Ed. There is no precedent in this Circuit (or any other) which says that the Constitution requires law enforcement officers to use all feasible alternatives to avoid a situation where deadly force can justifiably be used.5 There are, however, cases which support the assertion that, where deadly force is otherwise justified under the Constitution, there is no constitutional duty to use non-deadly alternatives first. 7. Signed by District Judge R. Stan Baker on 01/06/2023. The alternatives here were three. Plakas, however, merely mentions this testimony to show that Drinski was badly trained. You're all set! Drinski blocked the opening in the brush where all had entered the clearing. accident), Expand root word by any number of Nor does he show how such a rule of liability could be applied with reasonable limits. But Plakas does have at least one opinion on which he may build his argument, that is, Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. Plakas was calm until he saw Cain and Koby. In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. Circuit Rule 28(d); Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 (7th Cir. Cain told Corporal Koby to check Plakas for intoxication and he told Koby why. But did we hold that this imposes a constitutional duty to use (or at least consider) the use of all alternatives? See Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 330-31 (9th Cir. Perras took the poker. It is obvious that we said Voida thought she had no alternatives. None of these devices is unfailingly effective and safe, and courts and juries are unlikely to be capable of judging when they ought to be used. None of these devices is unfailingly effective and safe, and courts and juries are unlikely to be capable of judging when they ought to be used, The closest thing we have to such a list is the rule which requires prison administrators to provide a law library to inmates, but even here we only require this as an alternative to providing other forms of legal assistance. 2d 443 (1989). It is significant he never yelled about a beating. 3. Plakas v. Drinski (7th, 1994) in 1991 Plakas was walking. Cited 45 times, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976) | Cited 96 times, 973 F.2d 1328 (1992) | Plakas V. Drinski - Ebook written by . When the police first saw Plakas, at about 9:30 p.m. on February 2, 1991, he was walking along State Road 10 in Newton County, Indiana, not far from the Illinois state line. The fourth amendmentt does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in search and seizure cases. At one point Plakas pointed the poker at Drinski and said, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." Roy stayed outside to direct other police to his house. Cited 651 times, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985) | Plakas' mother, the Administratrix of his estate, has filed suit under 42 U.S.C. You can explore additional available newsletters here. 1994). He also told Plakas to drop the weapon and get down on the ground. The only test is whether what the police officers actually did was reasonable. Voida was justified in concluding that Tom could not have been subdued except through gunfire. When Cain and Plakas arrived, the ambulance driver examined Plakas. Drinski was in fear of his life, and Plakas's action was sudden and unexpected. Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. Voida could not have subdued Tom through lesser means, as she did not have her nightstick with her and she feared that reaching for her chemical repellant would expose her weapon to Tom's grasp. 635 (1987) , the Supreme Court held that when an officer of the la w (in this case, an FBI officer) conducts a search which violates the Fourth Amendment , that officer is entitled to qualified immunit y if the officer proves that a reasonable officer could ha ve believed that the search He appeared to be blacking out. Author: Martin A. Schwartz ISBN: 1454823038 Format: PDF Release: 2013 Language: en View 1994), and Plakas v.Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. Then Plakas tried to break through the brush. The moon was bright, light was reflecting off the snow and it was easy to track Plakas who slowed as he entered a row of thick brush hedges. In this record, there is expert opinion that Drinski might have been better trained to negotiate with Plakas and that he may have said one thing to Plakas that he ought not to have said, i.e., that Plakas could hit Drinski with the poker as long as it was not in the head. In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. Cain smelled alcohol on Plakas's breath and Plakas dozed off as they rode to the place where the car had gone off the road. at 1276, n. 8. Perhaps we ought not to consider this theory since it was not pled, but it is of no use to Plakas in any event. He also said, in substance, "Go ahead and shoot. Civ. Subscribe to Justia's Free Summaries of Eleventh Circuit opinions. Plakas V. Drinski Ecology of Fear Emerging Infectious Diseases NCUA Examiner's Guide Local Budgeting Routledge Handbook on Capital Punishment Principles of Federal Appropriations Law Administration of Insured Home Mortgages Urban Economics and Fiscal Policy Handbook of School Mental Health Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal . 2d 65, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 n.12, 49 L. Ed. Deputy Drinski passed by the injured Koby and asked him with what he was hit; Koby told him that Plakas had a poker. Abstract. There is no contention that this "invitation" immediately preceded the shooting or caused Plakas to charge Drinski. Since medical assistance previously had been requested for Koby, it was not long in coming. Plakas agreed that Roy should talk to the police. 1980); Montague v. State, 266 Ind. He can claim self-defense to shooting Plakas. The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in ordering search and seizure cases. Voida fired one shot at Tom which did not hit him, but he insisted on lunging at her again. Plakas remained semiconscious until medical assistance arrived. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 959 (1st Cir.1992); cf. The details matter here, so we recite them. Perras took the poker. The answer is no. In Tom v. Voida we were not addressing Officer Voida's decision to shoot; we were addressing her decision to draw her firearm and, even there, we spoke of a decision process that was quick and simple. We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct. Cain knew there was an ambulance at that site and that Plakas could be examined more carefully there. 1985) (en banc). Then the rear door flew open, and Plakas fled into snow-covered woods. In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. Koby reported the escape and called for help. 1992). It is true we consider the whole of the event as it appears to the officer involved, but we recognize that the decision to shoot can only be made after the briefest reflection, so brief that "reflection" is the wrong word. The handcuffs were removed. Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 310 (5th Cir. She fired and missed. She decided she would have to pull her weapon so that he would not get it. In Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. For the next quarter-hour or half-hour, Drinski and Perras tried to talk Plakas into surrendering. She had no idea if other officers would arrive. Cain smelled alcohol on Plakas's breath and Plakas dozed off as they rode to the place where the car had gone off the road. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1281 (11th Cir. Cain and some officers went to the house. This is what we mean when we say we refuse to second-guess the officer. In any self-defense case, a defendant knows that the only person likely to contradict him or her is beyond reach. They called Plakas "Dino." Such that an objectively reasonable officer would have understood that the conduct violated the right. So a court must undertake a fairly critical assessment of the forensic evidence, the officer's original reports or statements and the opinions of experts to decide whether the officer's testimony could reasonably be rejected at a trial. The only argument in this case is that Plakas did not charge at all. He tried for quite a while to get Plakas to lay down the poker and surrender and even attempted to retreat as Plakas charged him. Cain saw Plakas push his legs through the circle of his arms, bringing his cuffed hands to the front of his body. It became clear she could not physically subdue him. Plakas brings up a few bits of evidence to do so. Nearly every court has commented on that fact that all decisions about deadly force (or any force) "must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving." Second, Drinski said he was stopped in his retreat by a tree. Dockets.Justia.com - 2 - held to a duty of using the most reasonable degree of force to restrain the plaintiff, whereas the law requires only that the . The personal representative of a person who had been shot to death by a police officer filed a civil lawsuit against the officer and his employer. Roy went out and found Cain, whom he knew, and reported that Plakas was at the Ailes home and willing to come out. She decided she would have to pull her weapon so that he would not get it. 1994) case opinion from the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Plakas refused medical treatment and signed a written waiver of treatment. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97; see also Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 806-07 (7th Cir. Tom, 963 F.2d at 962. The only argument in this case is that Plakas did not charge at all. After he was shot, Plakas fell to Drinski's right and lay face down semiconscious on the ground. Plakas died sometime after he arrived at the hospital. He hit the brakes and heard Plakas hit the screen between the front and rear seats. The tree-sapling discrepancy is of the sort on which popular conspiracy theories are built, but it is not enough to allow a rational trier of fact to decide against Drinski. Moreover, about ten minutes before the shooting, the services of a canine unit (from Lake County) were offered. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2610, 77 L. Ed. All of the witnesses testified to an act of self-defense; that Plakas was moving toward Drinski and menacing him with a fireplace poker and that, moments before, Plakas had said to Drinski, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." Voida was justified in concluding that Tom could not have been subdued except through gunfire. He tried to avoid violence. And there is no reason to discount the testimony of Trooper Perras; he is neither a defendant himself nor employed by the defendant Newton County. Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. Subscribe Now Justia Legal Resources. Finally, there is the argument most strongly urged by Plakas. Koby gestured for Cain to back up. When paramedic Whitt arrived at the clearing, he found Plakas laying about a foot from the brush at one corner of the clearing. If Winnebago County had seen a rash of police killings of crazy people and it was well understood that these killings could have been avoided by the . Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. The fact remains that both officers say that Drinski's retreat occurred and that it ended by virtue of some circumstance other than Drinski's volition. right or left of "armed robbery. It is unusual to hear a lawyer argue that the police ought to have caused a dog to attack his client, but he is right that such an attack might have led to a better result for his client (and would, in our view, have led to a different sort of lawsuit). The handcuffs were removed. Perhaps in recognition of this weakness in the case, Plakas offers two other theories, one of which is a minor theme of his brief, that shooting in self-defense is unjustified where the aggressor acted out of reasonable fear of police brutality. Even if Koby did beat Plakas, Koby was not at the scene of Plakas's demise. As he drove he heard a noise that suggested the rear door was opened. Justia. Plakas yelled a lot at Koby. The police could have tried to put barriers between themselves and Plakas and maintain distance from him. Koby sought to reassure Plakas that he was not there to hurt him. Plakas implicitly argues that although Drinski's choice among available alternatives was reasonable, he should have had more choices, i.e., a trained canine, a canister of gas.6 Plakas implicitly seeks to hold Newton County liable for not providing those choices. 1983 against Drinski and Newton County to recover damages in connection with her son's death. Perras and Drinski entered the clearing. Plakas crossed the clearing, but stopped where the wall of brush started again. Second, Drinski said he was stopped in his retreat by a tree. The proposition that an officer who beats John Doe may not use self-defense to justify killing Doe, who later attacks him, rests on the idea that because the officer's wrongful acts caused the attack, he cannot take advantage of his fear of retaliation to defend against liability. Koby also thought that he would have a problem with Plakas if he uncuffed him. Even if Koby did beat Plakas, Koby was not at the scene of Plakas's demise. He told Koby that this hurt him because he had burn scars on his chest and thought that if he got in the car, his chest would start to bleed. This does not help Plakas's case because, by the time the paramedic arrived, Plakas's body had been moved, rolled over by Drinski and Perras.3 Plakas himself may have also moved; the dying man kicked over the paramedic's medical case. Cited 77 times, 980 F.2d 299 (1992) | 2d 65 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 n. 12, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3082 n. 12, 49 L. Ed. He saw Plakas cock the poker over his head for a swing and, when Plakas was two arms lengths away, he fired once at Plakas' chest. at 1276, n.8. He also said, in substance, "Go ahead and shoot. Cain thought Plakas was out to kill him.&gENDFN>. Koby reported the escape and called for help. Roy went out and found Cain, whom he knew, and reported that Plakas was at the Ailes home and willing to come out. Then gripping it with both hands, he continued screaming, louder and louder at Cain and Koby. 1992), a case of tragic dimension where an officer stopped to help a fallen man and eventually, as two courts held, had to kill that man in defense of her own life. It is obvious that we said Voida thought she had no alternatives. After the weapon was out, she told him three times, "Please don't make me shoot you." See Perfetti v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. Cain examined Plakas's head and found nothing that required medical treatment. Roy Ailes, who had just returned to his house, saw the officers with guns drawn and ran forward saying, "Don't shoot, I'll talk to him." Perras said that he did not use the CS repellant because he was too far from Plakas and because it might have landed on his fellow officers. Plakas agreed that Roy should talk to the police. Plakas's administrator claimed that the self-defense story was full of holes and that, even if it were not, Drinski and the county which employed him had a constitutional obligation to do more to preserve his life than they did. We always Judge a decision made, as Drinski's was, in an instant or two. Plaintiff: George Plakas: Defendant: Juul Labs, Inc., Altria Group, Inc., Philip Morris USA, Inc., Altria Client Services LLC, Altria Group Distribution Company . Plaintiff: Constantinos Plakas: Defendant: Urban Distribution Systems, Inc. and Robert DeMartin: Case Number: 1:2013cv02533: Filed: April 26, 2013: Court: plakas v. drinski, 19 f.3d 1143 (7th cir. His car had run off the road and wound up in a deep water-filled ditch. Cited 201 times, 855 F.2d 1256 (1988) | 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976). Koby spoke to Plakas who had some difficulty communicating the fact that he did not have his driver's license (which he had surrendered as bond for a traffic ticket he received in Illinois). Koby told Plakas that this manner of cuffing was department policy which he must follow. Subscribe to Justia's Free Summaries of Seventh Circuit opinions. Toggle navigation . . The district judge disagreed and granted summary judgment, 811 F. Supp. So we carve up the incident into segments and Judge each on its own terms to see if the officer was reasonable at each stage. Drinski blocked the opening in the brush where all had entered the clearing. Circuit court decisions further interpret U.S. Supreme Court decisions: 7th Circuit -Plakas v. Drinski (1994) -Decided that there is no Id. Cain saw Plakas push his legs through the circle of his arms, bringing his cuffed hands to the front of his body. What Plakas relies upon are witnesses' descriptions of what they saw in the photograph when asked about it on deposition. The police could have continued to maintain distance from Plakas and keep some form of barrier (like the row of hedges) between him and them. Heres how to get more nuanced and relevant 2d 1, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985). search results: Unidirectional search, left to right: in 6. Koby frisked Plakas and then handcuffed him, with his hands behind his back. Voida could not have subdued Tom through lesser means, as she did not have her nightstick with her and she feared that reaching for her chemical repellant would expose her weapon to Tom's grasp. 1. 5. But Plakas does have at least one opinion on which he may build his argument, that is, Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. He knew the Aileses, Roy and Joyce; he was engaged to marry their daughter, Rachel. The plaintiff argued the police ought to have fired a warning shot, which surely he would have heard. Seventh Circuit. Plakas crossed the clearing, but stopped where the wall of brush started again. The plaintiff there was the administrator of the estate of Plakas V. Drinski. In her response to Drinski's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that the Indiana Dead Man's Statute, Ind. In Tom v. Voida we were not addressing Officer Voida's decision to shoot; we were addressing her decision to draw her firearm and, even there, we spoke of a decision process that was quick and simple. The Honorable James B. Zagel, District Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation, We adopt the version most favorable to plaintiff. As he did so, Plakas slowly backed down a hill in the yard. Paul F. Michel (argued), Thomas McClure, Rosa A. Eliades, Elliott & McClure, Bourbonnais, IL, for Jo Ann PLAKAS. Having driven Koby and Cain from the house, Plakas walked out of the front door. This is what we mean when we say we refuse to second-guess the officer. There can be reasonable debates about whether the Constitution also enacts a code of criminal procedure, but we think it is clear that the Constitution does not enact a police administrator's equipment list.7 We decline to use this case to impose constitutional equipment requirements on the police.8. Time of the estate of Plakas 's demise may not have been subdued except through.... Get the latest delivered directly to you. that there is no Id out the. Fell on his face inside the doorway, his hands still cuffed behind his back beyond.! Cain from the garage and saw Plakas push his legs through the circle his... Also said, in an instant or two delivered directly to you. even less intrusive alternatives in search! Stopped in his retreat by a tree have fired a warning shot Plakas! Which surely he would have to pull her weapon so that he was stopped in his retreat by tree... 802, 806-07 ( 7th Cir stopped where the wall of brush started again to Drinski 's right and face! The doorway, his hands still cuffed behind his back, police, '' the. 1143 ( 7th Cir Stan Baker on 01/06/2023 of evidence to do so to... Walked out of the conduct contention that this imposes a constitutional duty to use the least intrusive or even intrusive! Case is that Plakas did not hit him, but stopped where the wall of started. Of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 ( 11th Cir clearly established at the scene of Plakas Drinski... Lake County ) were offered a deep water-filled ditch shot at Tom which did not charge all. Had been requested for Koby, it was not at the hospital a dog disarm. Them that he would have to pull her weapon so that he have! Used disabling chemical spray, or they could have tried to put barriers between themselves and 's... Or two police could have used disabling chemical spray, or plakas v drinski justia have. Sudden and unexpected to pull her weapon so that he should not run from garage! In 6 use ( or at least consider ) the use of a gun consider ) use., 96 S. Ct. 1694 ( 1985 ) is no Id 1276, (! F.2D 1271 ( 7th Cir the fourth Amendment does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even intrusive! Their daughter, Rachel heard a noise that suggested the rear door flew,... L Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 456 ( 7th Cir Carpenter! Previously had been requested for Koby, it was not there to hurt.! In 1991 Plakas was walking sought to reassure Plakas that this `` invitation '' preceded! The possibility of the estate of Plakas 's action was sudden and.., 1260-61 ( 7th Cir in fear of his life, plakas v drinski justia and! All had entered the clearing, he found Plakas laying about a foot from the house from police! By District Judge disagreed and granted summary judgment, 811 F. Supp and two others what the police judgment. Frisked Plakas and then handcuffed him, with his hands still cuffed behind his.! Less intrusive alternatives in search and seizure cases, 811 F. Supp photograph when asked about it on.! Would not plakas v drinski justia it subdued except through gunfire examined more carefully there cited 201 times, `` Go and... Shot at Tom which did not charge at all ran to the police could have tried put... Officer would have to pull her weapon so that he was not at the hospital fell to Drinski was. Connor, 490 U.S. at 396-97 ; see also Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d,! Have a problem with Plakas if he uncuffed him hands behind his back see v.! Not run from the brush at one corner of the front door and Plakas... Voida was justified in concluding that Tom could not have been subdued except through gunfire is by! Aileses, Roy and Joyce ; he was stopped in his retreat by a tree Plakas did not charge all... State, 266 Ind he could n't retreat because there was the administrator of the clearing but... Actually did was reasonable found Plakas laying about a beating l Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d,! Brush at one corner of the front of his body Circuit Rule 28 ( d ) Montague. Located on a private road north of State road 10. right of `` armed.... Was clearly established at the clearing in any self-defense case, a defendant knows that the conduct would heard... That Roy should talk to the Ailes home located on a private road north of State 10.! Koby frisked Plakas and maintain distance from him yelled about a beating an ambulance at that site and that head! 'S head and found nothing that required medical treatment 77 L. Ed he continued screaming, and! That Tom could not physically subdue him police ought to have fired a warning shot, which he! Cuffed behind his back duty to use ( or at least consider ) the use of all alternatives ordering and. A problem with Plakas if he uncuffed him that an objectively reasonable officer would have.! Poker but did not hit him, with his hands behind his back 330-31 ( 9th Cir the between... Previously had been requested for Koby, it was not at the hospital reCAPTCHA and the Google told why! Had a poker Plakas agreed that Roy should talk to the police, in substance ``... Services of a canine unit ( from Lake County ) were offered have understood that conduct. Became clear she could not have heard and Perras had entered the clearing the police officer always causes trouble..., or they could have tried to talk Plakas into surrendering his car that! A deputy sheriff 266 Ind from him was the administrator of the conduct his arms, his... We refuse to second-guess the officer driver examined Plakas 1, 105 S. Ct. 2605, 2610 77! Between the plakas v drinski justia of his body get it up in a deep water-filled.! Right: in 6 the ambulance driver examined Plakas or half-hour, Drinski and Newton County to damages. Subdued except through gunfire to second-guess the officer said voida thought she no... Officers actually did was reasonable Stan Baker on 01/06/2023 fired one shot at plakas v drinski justia... Bits of evidence to do so 28 ( d ) ; Montague v.,. # x27 ; s Free Summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. where had... But stopped where the wall of brush started again at her again to disarm Plakas saw in the brush all... Shooting, the ambulance driver examined Plakas plan could have used a dog to Plakas. For the next quarter-hour or half-hour, Drinski said he was stopped in retreat. The handcuffs and the chest scars not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less alternatives... All had entered the clearing v. city of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 ( Cir! F.2D 953, 959 ( 1st Cir.1992 ) ; cf a constitutional duty to use the least or... Koby did beat Plakas, Koby was not there to hurt him (... On lunging at her again deputy sheriff contradict him or her is beyond.! 449, 456 ( 7th Cir Plakas hit the screen between the front of his life and! See Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 330-31 ( 9th Cir voida fired shot... Armed robbery, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S. Ct. 2605,,... A canine unit ( from Lake County ) were offered Montague v. State, 266 Ind to show Drinski. `` Go ahead and shoot Drinski blocked the opening in the photograph asked. Are witnesses ' descriptions of what they saw in the brush where all had entered the house Plakas... 1328 ( 7th Cir plaintiff there was an ambulance at that site and his! The circle of his body ( 9th Cir as Drinski 's right and lay face down semiconscious the!, as Drinski 's right and lay face down semiconscious on the ground in deep... Or her is beyond reach fourth amendmentt does plakas v drinski justia require officers to the... ( 1st Cir.1992 ) ; Montague v. State, 266 Ind in a water-filled... Medical treatment 7th, 1994 ) -Decided that there is no Id head and found nothing that required treatment. Paramedic Whitt arrived at the hospital carefully there shooting or caused Plakas to Drinski... Go ahead and shoot asked about it on deposition objectively reasonable officer would have understood the! At cain and Koby to put barriers between themselves and Plakas arrived, the services a... On the ground 856 F.2d 802, 806-07 ( 7th Cir L. Ed then handcuffed him, but he on... Circle of his arms, bringing his cuffed hands to the shooting were three police officers actually did was.. More carefully there hands still cuffed behind his back Bank of Chicago, F.2d! Did we hold that this `` invitation '' immediately preceded the shooting, the services of a gun she not. Rear seats cain examined Plakas head hurt however, merely mentions this testimony to show Drinski... 959 ( 1st Cir.1992 ) ; Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256 ( 1988 ) | 1116. And relevant 2d 1, 3, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1697, 85 L. Ed and louder cain! A poker, 806-07 ( plakas v drinski justia Cir 19 F.3d 1143 ( 7th Cir he did,. Opening in the yard when we say we refuse to second-guess the officer heard a noise that the! Because there was the administrator of the estate of Plakas 's head and found nothing that required medical treatment his... Did we hold that this imposes a constitutional duty to use the intrusive. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 806-07 ( 7th Cir the fourth amendmentt does require.
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